

Application No.: A.26-06-XXX  
Exhibit No.: SDGE-1  
Witness: Andrew Scates

**PREPARED DIRECT TESTIMONY OF**

**ANDREW SCATES**

**ON BEHALF OF**

**SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY**

**\*\*REDACTED, PUBLIC VERSION\*\***

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION  
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**



**JUNE 1, 2026**

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ATTACHMENT A: 2025 Summary Load Data and LMP Price Forecasts.xlsx - **Confidential**

ATTACHMENT B: 2025 Incremental Bid Cost Calculations.xlsx - **Confidential**

ATTACHMENT C: 2025 Self Schedules Supporting Data 1.xlsx - **Confidential**

ATTACHMENT D: 2025 Self Schedules Supporting Data 2.xlsx - **Confidential**

ATTACHMENT E: 2025 Master File (RDT) Change Exceptions.xlsx - **Confidential**

ATTACHMENT F: 2025 Annual Summary.xlsx - **Confidential**

ATTACHMENT G: 2025 ERRA Demand Response Metric 1.xlsx

ATTACHMENT H: 2025 ERRA Demand Response Metric.xlsx

ATTACHMENT I: 2025 ERRRA Demand Response Metric 5.xlsx

ATTACHMENT J: 2025 ERRRA Demand Response Metric 6.xlsx

ATTACHMENT K: Confidentiality Declaration of Andrew Scates

**Due to the large size of the .xlsx attachments, those excel documents are only being sent electronically.**

ACRONYM GLOSSARY

**PREPARED DIRECT TESTIMONY OF  
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**I. INTRODUCTION**

This testimony presents San Diego Gas & Electric Company’s (“SDG&E”) compliance with least-cost dispatch (“LCD”) requirements during the record period of January 1, 2025 through December 31, 2025, as specified by applicable California Public Utilities Commission (“Commission”) decisions. LCD pertains to the day-ahead and intra-day dispatch and trading of SDG&E’s portfolio of resources, including utility-owned generation (“UOG”) and power purchase agreements (“PPA”). The following summarizes Commission decisions on LCD and how SDG&E implemented these decisions in a manner consistent with its current Commission-approved Bundled Procurement Plan (“BPP”).<sup>1</sup>

Standard of Conduct 4 (“SOC 4”) was adopted by the Commission in Decision (“D.”) 02-10-062 and further discussed in D.02-12-069, D.02-12-074, D.03-06-076, and D.05-01-054. The decisions established standards of conduct by which an IOU must administer its portfolio, specifically SOC 4, which states that “[t]he utilities shall prudently administer all contracts and generation resources and dispatch the energy in a least-cost manner.”<sup>2</sup>

During 2025, SDG&E filed four quarterly Advice Letters (“AL”) covering the record period as required in D.02-10-062. AL 4601-E-E for Q1 2025 was approved August 14, 2025, AL 4651-E-E- for Q2 2025 was approved 10/14/2025, AL 4698-E for Q3 2025, and AL 4697-E for Q4 202E are pending approval. These advice letters provide detailed information on

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<sup>1</sup> For purposes of the Commission’s review and the compliance findings requested herein, the relevant BPP is SDG&E’s BPP implemented by AL 2850-E (including subsequent updates thereto such as AL 3738-E approved by Resolution No. E-5196).

<sup>2</sup> D.02-10-062 at 52 and Conclusions of Law (“COL”) 11 at 74.

1 transactions that SDG&E executed while following its LCD process, as well as other data (*e.g.*,  
2 customer load, resource schedules and fuel transactions) pertinent to the LCD process during the  
3 record period. SDG&E’s Quarterly Compliance Reports (“QCRs”) for 2025 were in compliance  
4 with SDG&E’s Commission-approved BPP and applicable procurement-related rulings and  
5 decisions.

## 6 **II. SDG&E’S COMPLIANCE SHOWING**

7 SDG&E testimony and attachments will demonstrate compliance with LCD based on  
8 applicable regulatory requirements, notably D.15-05-005 (the “Decision”) and D.18-10-006  
9 (“Decision Approving Settlement Between San Diego Gas & Electric Company and the Office  
10 of Ratepayer Advocates”).<sup>3</sup>

### 11 **A. SDG&E Showing is in Accordance with D.15-05-005**

12 Based on the Decision, SDG&E’s testimony will include the following:

- 13 • Overview/narrative of LCD in the California Independent System Operator  
14 (“CAISO”) markets.
- 15 • Description of SDG&E’s bidding and scheduling processes.
- 16 • Summary of reports/tables documenting aggregated annual exceptions for:
  - 17 ○ Incremental cost bid calculations
  - 18 ○ Self-commitment decisions
  - 19 ○ Master File data changes
- 20 • Narratives reviewing significant strategy changes, internal software and/or  
21 process changes and CAISO market design changes during the record period.
- 22 • A background summary table outlining baseline annual data, including:
  - 23 ○ Total capacity of the dispatchable (bid in) portfolio
  - 24 ○ Total dispatchable capacity lost due to planned or forced outages

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<sup>3</sup> The Office of Ratepayer Advocates has been renamed as the California Public Advocates Office (hereinafter referred to as “Cal PA”).

- 1           ○     Total capacity of non-dispatchable (exclusively self-scheduled)
- 2           portfolio
- 3           ○     Total non-dispatchable capacity lost due to planned or forced
- 4           outages
- 5           ○     Total Energy awards (dispatchable and non-dispatchable by
- 6           resource type and broken down by self-scheduled versus market
- 7           awards)
- 8       •     Demand Response (“DR”) metrics will be provided for dispatchable DR programs
- 9           with economic triggers including the following:
  - 10          ○     Capacity Bidding
- 11       •     Annual Summary of results reporting requirement related to dispatch of DR
- 12           resources including when all programs were dispatched and an explanation of
- 13           when DR resources could have been dispatched but were not.
- 14       •     Calculation of the number of hours when the utility forecasts that trigger criteria
- 15           will be reached, as a percentage of hours in which the trigger conditions were
- 16           reached in the same period.
- 17       •     Total energy actually dispatched as a proportion of maximum available energy for
- 18           each DR program broken down monthly and annually.
- 19       •     Explanation as to why a DR resource was not dispatched despite its maximum
- 20           availability.
- 21       •     Cost impact on overall resource dispatch of not calling DR programs up to their
- 22           maximum available amounts when program was forecasted to be triggered.
- 23       •     Consideration of whether the selection of the DR events called minimized overall
- 24           portfolio cost of dispatching supply resources.
- 25       •     Explanation of SDG&E’s opportunity cost methodology and demonstration of its
- 26           application during the Record Year.

1           **B.   SDG&E’s LCD Showing is in Accordance With the SDG&E/Cal PA**  
2           **Settlement**<sup>4</sup>

3           As in last year’s testimony and in accordance with the Settlement mentioned above, this  
4 testimony will include the following:

- 5           •       Settlement Provision 1.2: Reasons in Attachment E- Master File Change  
6                   exceptions for selecting proxy or registered costs. *See* Section V. of testimony,  
7                   below, and Attachment E.
- 8           •       Settlement Provision 1.3: Calculations for determining whether a discretionary  
9                   self-schedule has a cost impact. *See* Section V. below and Attachments C and D.
- 10          •       Settlement Provision 1.5: Report instances in which the locational marginal price  
11                   (“LMP”) is greater than the bid price, but no dispatch was awarded. *See* Section  
12                   V. below and Attachment B.
- 13          •       Settlement Provision 1.6: Identify in testimony, on a month-to-month basis,  
14                   which dates the Demand Response Programs were unavailable, and therefore not  
15                   dispatched, due to a lack of nominations from the aggregators. *See* Section XI.  
16                   below and Attachment G-J.

17           **III.   SDG&E PORTFOLIO OVERVIEW**

18           For the record period, most of SDG&E’s energy requirements were met with SDG&E  
19 PPAs and UOGs. SDG&E’s PPAs included qualifying facility (“QF”) contracts and contracts  
20 for renewable energy, dispatchable generation and out-of-state resources, all of which are  
21 described in the Direct Testimony of SDG&E witness Moriah Saldaña. SDG&E’s UOG  
22 assessment included combined-cycle (“CC”) plants, combustion turbines (“CT”) generators, and  
23 non-generating resources (“NGRs”) such as energy storage batteries.

24           The tables below provide summary data for resources in SDG&E’s portfolio as of  
25 January 1, 2025. The must-take resources in Table 1a are non-dispatchable; SDG&E has an

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<sup>4</sup> *See* D.18-10-006.

1 obligation to accept the generation that is produced from these resources without regard to  
 2 variable cost and therefore are exempt from SDG&E’s LCD process described in this testimony.  
 3 The total of their generation in part determines SDG&E’s net long or short position, which did  
 4 factor into LCD. The resources in Table 1b are dispatchable and were therefore the focus of  
 5 SDG&E’s least-cost process during the record period. The “Capacity” column in Tables 1a and  
 6 1b below are derived from CAISO Master File Resource Data Template (“RDT”) maximum  
 7 capacities for resources where SDG&E is the scheduling coordinator (“SC”) and contract  
 8 capacities for resources where SDG&E is not the SC.

9 **Table 1a: Must-Take, Wind, Solar Resources**

<b>Resource</b>	<b>Contract MW</b>	<b>Dispatch Profile</b>	<b>Ancillary Service Capability</b>
QF contracts (Natural Gas)	4.1	Baseload As-Available	None
QF Renewable	.95	Intermittent As-Available	None
Renewable non-intermittent resources	31.5	Baseload (as available)	None
Renewable Intermittent Resources	2291.21 (maximum)	Intermittent	None

10 **Table 1b: Dispatchable Resources**

<b>Resource*</b>	<b>Capacity MW</b>	<b>Dispatch Profile</b>	<b>Ancillary Service Capability</b>
Palomar CCGT Natural Gas SP15	588.21	Load Following	Spinning Reserve Regulation
Cuyamaca CT Natural Gas SP15	45.42	Peaker	Non-Spinning Reserve

<b>Resource*</b>	<b>Capacity MW</b>	<b>Dispatch Profile</b>	<b>Ancillary Service Capability</b>
Miramar 1 CT Natural Gas SP15	45	Peaker	Non-Spinning Reserve
Miramar 2 CT Natural Gas SP15	44	Peaker	Non-Spinning Reserve
Orange Grove CT Natural Gas SP15	96	Peaker	Non-Spinning Reserve
El Cajon Energy Center CT Natural Gas SP15	48.1	Peaker	Non-Spinning Reserve
Escondido Energy Center CT (Wellhead) Natural Gas SP15	48.71	Peaker	Non-Spinning Reserve
Desert Star CCGT Natural Gas SP15	494.58	Load Following	Spinning Reserve
Goal Line CT <sup>5</sup> Natural Gas SP15	49.9	Peaker	None
Eastern Battery NGR SP15	7.5	Battery – Energy Storage	Spinning Reserve Regulation
Escondido Battery 1 NGR SP15	10	Battery – Energy Storage	Spinning Reserve Regulation
Escondido Battery 2 NGR SP15	10	Battery – Energy Storage	Spinning Reserve Regulation
Escondido Battery 3 NGR SP15	10	Battery – Energy Storage	Spinning Reserve Regulation
Pio Pico 1 Natural Gas SP15	111.3	Peaker	Non-Spinning Reserve/Spinning Reserve Regulation

<sup>5</sup> The Contract between SDG&E and Goal Line was terminated as of February 15, 2025.

<b>Resource*</b>	<b>Capacity MW</b>	<b>Dispatch Profile</b>	<b>Ancillary Service Capability</b>
Pio Pico 2 Natural Gas SP15	112.7	Peaker	Non-Spinning Reserve/Spinning Reserve Regulation
Pio Pico 3 Natural Gas SP15	112	Peaker	Non-Spinning Reserve/Spinning Reserve Regulation
Carlsbad 2 Natural Gas SP15	105.5	Peaker	Non-Spinning Reserve/Spinning Reserve Regulation
Carlsbad MSG Natural Gas SP15	422	MSG/Peaker	Non-Spinning Reserve/Spinning Reserve Regulation
Miguel Battery NGR SP15	2	Battery – Energy Storage	Spinning Reserve Regulation
Top Gun Battery NGR SP15	30	Battery-Energy Storage	Spinning Reserves Regulation
Valley Center Battery NGR SP15	54	Battery-Energy Storage	Regulation
Kearny North Battery NGR SP15	10	Battery-Energy Storage	Regulation
Kearny South Battery NGR SP15	10	Battery-Energy Storage	Regulation
Santa Ana Battery NGR SP15	20	Battery-Energy Storage	Spinning Reserve Regulation
Sagebrush	80	Battery-Energy Storage	Spinning Reserve Regulation
Los Alamitos 1	10	Hybrid	None
Los Alamitos 2	10	Hybrid	None

<b>Resource*</b>	<b>Capacity MW</b>	<b>Dispatch Profile</b>	<b>Ancillary Service Capability</b>
Fallbrook	40	Battery-Energy Storage	Spinning Reserve Regulation
Westside Canal	130	Battery-Energy Storage	Spinning Reserve Regulation
Air Attack Base	.47	Battery-Energy Storage	None
Boulevard Energy Storage	10	Battery-Energy Storage	None
Clairemont Energy Storage	9	Battery-Energy Storage	None
Elliott Energy Storage	10	Battery-Energy Storage	Nones,
Melrose BESS 1	10	Battery-Energy Storage	None
Melrose BESS 2	10	Battery-Energy Storage	None
Pala Gomez Creek BESS	10	Battery-Energy Storage	None
Paradise Energy Storage	10	Battery-Energy Storage	None
CALD BESS 1	100	Battery-Energy Storage	Spinning Reserve Regulation
Sanborn Solar 2 SBESS 4	47	Battery-Energy Storage	Spinning Reserve Regulation
Bottleneck Energy Storage	80	Battery-Energy Storage	Spinning Reserve Regulation
Dark Sky BESS	7.33	Battery-Energy Storage	None

<b>Resource*</b>	<b>Capacity MW</b>	<b>Dispatch Profile</b>	<b>Ancillary Service Capability</b>
Buckman Springs BESS	.54	Battery-Energy Storage	None
Daggett Storage	113.5	Battery-Energy Storage	Spinning Reserve Regulation
Nova Power Bank Storage	60	Battery-Energy Storage	Regulation
Westside Canal 2	100	Battery-Energy Storage	Spinning Reserve

\*CCGT= Combined Cycle Gas Turbine; CT= Combustion

#### **IV. OVERVIEW OF LEAST-COST DISPATCH IN CAISO MARKETS**

On April 1, 2009, following Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) approval of its market redesign application, the CAISO implemented the Market Redesign Technology Upgrade (“MRTU”) now simply referred to as the “Market”, which introduced fundamental changes in the way resources are committed and dispatched. The most significant of these changes was the implementation of a centralized energy market which requires load-serving entities (“LSEs”) to procure energy and ancillary services (“A/S”), and generators to sell energy and A/S, through the CAISO markets based on self-schedules and economic bids.

The CAISO established a centralized spot market that enables all resources, through standardized bidding and scheduling rules, to be competitively dispatched based on costs to serve total system load, subject to operational and transmission constraints. These resources are not matched up to any LSE’s load; LSEs now meet their needs by self-scheduling or bidding for energy in the CAISO market. However, LSEs may rely on bilaterally procured resources to hedge the day-to-day cost of buying energy and A/S from the CAISO markets, to the extent these

1 contracted resources pass on the revenues for energy and A/S awards received from those same  
2 CAISO markets back to the LSE.

3         SDG&E periodically revises and improves its LCD processes to meet tariff rules and  
4 operating requirements while maintaining compliance with SOC 4, particularly with regard to  
5 self-schedules, convergence bids and economic bids for its dispatchable resources. These self-  
6 schedules and bids for dispatchable units must accurately reflect variable costs to enable the  
7 CAISO market to produce energy and A/S awards for SDG&E’s resources that are consistent  
8 with LCD. SDG&E utilizes a cross-validation procedure for bids to ensure the accuracy of its  
9 resource bids with respect to cost and the accuracy of its self-schedules in the CAISO market.

10         The CAISO market solves for the least-cost unit commitment and dispatch solution  
11 incorporating self-schedules and economic bids from generators and load which takes into  
12 account resource operational characteristics and constraints, resource and transmission outages,  
13 impact of convergence bids, inter-temporal constraints and the effect of adjacent balancing  
14 authorities impacted by the CAISO system. It is important to note that CAISO is solving for the  
15 lowest system cost over a 24-hour time horizon, not the highest revenue for a resource; therefore,  
16 looking at a resource’s awards in isolation may not yield expected results on an hourly basis. If a  
17 resource is awarded in a manner below their costs for a given 24-hour period, the resource may  
18 qualify for bid cost recovery (“BCR”). The nodal (“Pnode”) market prices explicitly account for  
19 the economic effects of re-dispatching resources to relieve congestion constraints.

20         The CAISO optimizes the dispatch of the several hundred generators across its system to  
21 find the overall lowest-cost mix of resources to meet CAISO system load requirements  
22 (including those of SDG&E). The CAISO market also co-optimizes the allocation of  
23 dispatchable capacity between generation and A/S capacity, based on prices submitted for each

1 of these services in the resource bids.<sup>6</sup> The resulting allocation of awards between generation  
2 and A/S across the system therefore reflects the economic tradeoff between capacity used for  
3 generation and what is reserved for A/S.

4 The CAISO employs an iterative mixed-integer programming methodology to account  
5 for the numerous constraints cited above. A technical bulletin published by the CAISO describes  
6 in greater detail its LCD optimization processes with respect to the IFM (“Integrated Forward  
7 Market”). Specifically, Section 2.3 states:

8 The SCUC [Security Constrained Unit Commitment] engine determines optimally  
9 the commitment status and the Schedules of Generating Units as well as  
10 Participating Loads and Resource-Specific System Resources.

11 *The objective is to minimize the Start-Up and Minimum Load costs and bid in*  
12 *Energy costs and Ancillary Services, subject to network as well as resource*  
13 *related constraints over the entire Time Horizon, e.g., the Trading Day in the*  
14 *IFM. The time interval of the optimization is one hour in the DAM and 5 or 15*  
15 *minutes in the RTM depending on the application.*

16 In IFM the overall production (or Bid) cost is determined by the total of the Start-  
17 Up and Minimum Load Cost of CAISO-committed Generating Units, the Energy  
18 Bids of all scheduled Generating Units, and the Ancillary Service Bids of  
19 resources selected to provide Ancillary Services. *This objective leads to a least-*  
20 *cost multi-product co-optimization methodology that maximizes economic*  
21 *efficiency, relieves network Congestion and considers physical constraints.* The  
22 economic efficiency of the market operation can be achieved through a least cost  
23 resource commitment and scheduling with co-optimization of Energy and  
24 Ancillary Services.<sup>7</sup>

25 A feature of the CAISO market is the ability for market participants to submit  
26 self-schedules rather than economic (or price) bids for load and generation. A self-schedule is a  
27 price-taker bid that is awarded, regardless of the Pnode clearing price (even if negative), subject

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<sup>6</sup> For example, if a generator’s energy bid price is \$10/MWh in-the-money relative to the clearing price, then the IFM may award the generator an A/S award only if the A/S clearing price exceeds \$10 or the generator’s bid, whichever is greater.

<sup>7</sup> California ISO, *Technical Bulletin 2009-06-05: Market Optimization Details* (November 19, 2009) at 2-8 – 2-9 (emphasis added), available at <http://www.caiso.com/Documents/TechnicalBulletin-MarketOptimizationDetails.pdf>.

1 to operational constraints. SDG&E submits a self-schedule for its forecasted load in the Day  
2 Ahead Market (“DAM”). SDG&E also submits self-schedules for its (non-intermittent  
3 resources) must-take resources in the DAM.<sup>8</sup> This approach is needed because SDG&E has an  
4 obligation to receive energy from these resources, regardless of the market price, and self-  
5 scheduling in the DAM ensures that revenues paid to these resources effectively offset costs  
6 charged to SDG&E load.

7           Generally, self-schedules do not support the least-cost objective if a resource is capable  
8 of responding to price signals. As described earlier, self-schedules are price-taker bids which  
9 may provide no assurance that market revenues will pay for fuel and other operating costs, and  
10 thereby may expose SDG&E ratepayers to unnecessary risk of losses. Furthermore, self-  
11 schedules could affect the CAISO’s ability to optimally procure energy and A/S which are  
12 necessary for grid reliability. Operational constraints will at times make self-scheduling  
13 preferable to cost based bids.

14           Consequently, SDG&E primarily submits cost-based price bids for its dispatchable  
15 generation rather than self-schedules. Under CAISO market rules, cost-based bids provide  
16 SDG&E ratepayers a means to recover variable costs associated with start-up, minimum load,  
17 and dispatch from the market. Moreover, price bids enable the CAISO to perform its co-  
18 optimization between energy and A/S awards.

19           Finally, with respect to LCD, price bids allow for CAISO market results to meet the  
20 least-cost dispatch solution across the entire system, including SDG&E’s service territory,  
21 because the CAISO selects the mix of resources with the lowest total variable cost (as

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<sup>8</sup> For brevity, this prepared direct testimony does not distinguish between SDG&E or the resource owner performing the Scheduling Coordinator functions for SDG&E’s resources.

1 represented by their price bids) to meet load requirements. To the extent SDG&E submits cost-  
2 based price bids reflecting variable costs per D.02-09-053, and most accurately represents  
3 operational parameters and constraints to the CAISO, the results produced by the CAISO  
4 markets for SDG&E's supply portfolio are consistent with the Commission's LCD requirements.

## 5 **V. LEAST-COST DISPATCH SCHEDULING AND BIDDING PROCESS**

6 SDG&E's LCD process is managed by SDG&E's Energy Supply and Dispatch Group  
7 ("ES&D"). Key personnel involved in daily LCD activity in the 2025 record period included  
8 fuel traders and schedulers, power traders, day-ahead (pre)schedulers and real-time transaction  
9 schedulers and analysts. The LCD process consisted of numerous functions, which are described  
10 in this section.

### 11 **A. Pre-Day-Ahead Planning**

12 During the record period, LCD forecasts for a particular delivery date began with a  
13 weekly production cost model that optimized resources to serve SDG&E's load requirement for  
14 the following 12-day period. The model software ("GenTrader")<sup>9</sup> was set up with numerous  
15 parameters, including load forecast, plant operating data, resource availabilities/outages,  
16 forecasted Locational Marginal Pricing ("LMP") prices for all relevant pricing points and  
17 dispatch constraints which allowed the model to perform complex analysis to produce a  
18 preliminary forecast of generation dispatch and market transactions that minimized total cost to

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<sup>9</sup> SDG&E uses GenTrader, a production cost and optimization software application produced by Power Costs Inc. ("PCI"). GenTrader employs an optimization algorithm to calculate the optimal, constraints-bound mix of market transactions and generation from SDG&E's resource portfolio over the study period. SDG&E acquired GenTrader as part of a PCI product suite in preparation for the new Market. PCI introduced GenTrader in 1999 and continues to implement modeling and technology enhancements that SDG&E receives under its license agreement. GenTrader is used by other clients across the country in nodal and traditional markets to optimize generation portfolios. Additional product description is available at PCI, Speeding Decisions, Optimization & Analytics, available at <https://www.pcienergysolutions.com/solutions/energy-trading-and-optimization/portfolio-optimization/>.

1 serve the forecasted load requirement. The GenTrader model produced expected utilization of  
2 resources for the planning horizon, including dispatch levels, fuel requirements and market  
3 transactions. A detailed description of the inputs to GenTrader which SDG&E used for  
4 determining an LCD forecast is as follows:

- 5 1. Load forecasts: SDG&E produced load forecasts using a load forecasting model  
6 developed by Enverus<sup>10</sup> The model utilizes multiple AI technologies such as  
7 artificial neural networks, fuzzy logic, genetic algorithms, and evolutionary  
8 computing,<sup>11</sup> and special proprietary algorithms analyzing relationships between  
9 historical bundled load and weather data to develop the load forecast for  
10 SDG&E’s customers. Prior to July 2023, SDG&E was calculating their bundled  
11 load by taking a System Load forecast (produced by Enverus) subtracting System  
12 losses and subtracting the Community Choice Aggregation (CCA)/Direct Access  
13 customer forecast. In order to eliminate the multiple variables in calculating  
14 bundled load, SDG&E began using historical actual (metered) bundled load from  
15 customer meters. The historical bundled load actuals allow for better control of  
16 inputs by eliminating unnecessary inputs to the prior bundled load forecast.  
17 These load forecasts were produced daily as inputs to the GenTrader 12-day LCD  
18 forecast.
- 19 2. Master File Updates and Operating constraints: The GenTrader model also  
20 required a variety of cost inputs for each dispatchable resource to properly  
21 determine its dispatch cost. The Master Files included a subset of data accessible  
22 by the resource’s scheduling coordinator which is referred to as the Resource Data  
23 Template (“RDT”). SDG&E periodically submitted master file changes via an  
24 RDT update process that was validated by CAISO. Such data included but was  
25 not limited to heat rates, ramp rates and variable operation and maintenance costs  
26 (“VOM”), minimum and maximum operating points, fuel delivery charges and

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<sup>10</sup> Previously known as Pattern Recognition Technologies. Inc. (“PRT”).

<sup>11</sup> As defined by Drilling Info, Future Technology Today, Ensemble of Adaptive Intelligent System Models, available at <https://www.enverus.com/products/short-term-grid-analytics-and-forecasting-solutions/>.

1 start-up and minimum load costs. In addition, numerous operating  
2 constraints/parameters, included in the RDT, were also fed into the model  
3 including start-up time, minimum shutdown and run times, multi-stage generation  
4 (“MSG”) transitions and ramp rates. The GenTrader model optimized the  
5 dispatch of each resource given its generation cost and operating constraints.

6 3. Forecast of resource availability: A portion of SDG&E’s resource portfolio was  
7 comprised of must-take resources (QF and renewable energy), as listed in Section  
8 II. SDG&E received weekly, and in some cases daily, forecasts of hourly  
9 deliveries from the resource operator. In addition, SDG&E generated availability  
10 forecasts for some smaller contracts based on historical performance. If the unit  
11 availabilities varied from the full operating capability or were on outage, they  
12 were communicated to the CAISO via the Outage Management System  
13 application (“OMS”).

14 4. Market prices: The GenTrader LCD forecast model required a forecast of fuel  
15 prices for each of the dispatchable resources in SDG&E’s portfolio, and a forecast  
16 of hourly power prices for various market delivery points where SDG&E  
17 generation units were located. Fuel prices were based on forward natural gas  
18 price curves at SoCal Border, SoCal CityGate and Kern Delivered locations  
19 derived from the New York Mercantile Exchange (“NYMEX”), Intercontinental  
20 Exchange (“ICE”) and broker quotes, and also including tariff or contract gas  
21 transportation costs. Power prices were based on forward power price curves for  
22 block power (derived from ICE and broker quotes) and shaped for each hour  
23 using price weighting factors derived from historical prices and load profiles.

24 5. Miscellaneous: Use-limited resources including NGR resources and demand  
25 response products were not modeled by GenTrader due to unique operating  
26 constraints and were therefore optimized separately on a day-ahead/weekly basis  
27 based on market conditions, LMP price forecasts and operating parameters.

28 GenTrader was then used to calculate the hourly dispatch level of dispatchable resource  
29 over the modeled period that was economic, or “in-the-money,” relative to forecasted LMP  
30 prices. This determination considered up-front commitment costs (start-up and minimum load

1 costs), incremental dispatch costs which varied by output level, and various operational  
2 constraints mostly consistent with resource data template (“RDT”) data used by the CAISO in its  
3 market processes. For must-take resources, generation was assumed to equal their forecasted  
4 availabilities. If the sum of must-take and in-the-money dispatchable generation was less than  
5 that hour’s load requirement, the short position, or Residual Net Short (“RNS”), was considered  
6 to be met with market purchases. If the sum of must-take and in-the-money generation was  
7 greater than that hour’s load requirement, the long position was considered to be surplus  
8 generation available for economic market sales.

## 9 **B. Day-Ahead Planning**

10 On a day-ahead basis by approximately 6:00 a.m., pre-schedulers updated the PCI  
11 software with updated values, specifically the load forecast, forecasted market prices and  
12 resource availabilities. Other resource operational data such as heat rates are relatively static  
13 between the 12-day plan and day-ahead plan and were not typically updated. Key distinctions  
14 between the 12-day and day-ahead model parameters were as follows:

- 15 1. Load forecast: SDG&E used a revised Enverus forecast with updated temperature  
16 and humidity forecasts. In addition, pre-schedulers have the ability to manually  
17 adjust the Enverus forecast to offset known limitations to the model. For  
18 example, because Enverus forecasts are based on historical data, SDG&E may  
19 make adjustments to reflect sudden changes to the weather forecast such as the  
20 onset of a heat wave. SDG&E did not make any manual adjustments in 2025.
- 21 2. Resource availabilities: SDG&E received updated and more accurate availability  
22 information for its resources on a day-ahead basis. These updates captured  
23 information that may not have been included in the 12-day model, such as  
24 ambient derates, forced derates, unit testing and outages. These updates were also  
25 submitted to the CAISO via OMS as required.
- 26 3. Market prices: Spot natural gas and power trade actively in the day-ahead market.  
27 SDG&E used two different price forecasts as inputs into optimization models.

1 One price forecast is developed internally, in the early morning before and during  
2 Day-Ahead (“DA”) trading, and the second was provided by an external entity  
3 after most of the DA trading subsided. For the first price forecast, SDG&E used  
4 an internal forecasting tool to forecast load and resource prices for the DA Market  
5 to be used for initial optimization model studies which helps provide guidance for  
6 CAISO generation awards, gas burn obligations, and market transactions. This  
7 internal DA price forecast utilizes actual market prices that are selected based on  
8 days that represent similar weather conditions, heat rates, gas prices, and other  
9 system conditions. The South Path 15 (SP15) trading hub due to its location in  
10 Southern California is used as the proxy location that trades on the  
11 Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) and serves as a benchmark for how SDG&E’s  
12 resources might clear. SDG&E applies a shaping factor based on the comparison  
13 of forecasted nodes’ clearing prices to the clearing price of SP-15 which results in  
14 hourly forecasted prices for all of SDG&E’s resource nodes and its Default Load  
15 Aggregation Point (DLAP). The second forecast was normally received after  
16 8:00AM which is typically after most of the DA trading volume is completed and  
17 serves as the final forecast that is used for resource management and bidding  
18 purposes. Because of the later receipt time, SDG&E’s internally developed price  
19 forecast is used for preliminary optimization runs, to provide an initial forecast for  
20 CAISO generation awards. In 2018, SDG&E began receiving nodal DA LMP  
21 price forecasts from an outside entity called Wood Mackenzie.<sup>12</sup> Wood  
22 Mackenzie is an independent, energy industry provider of “market intelligence”  
23 which includes nodal DA LMP forecasts and possible transmission congestion  
24 risks associated with SDG&E’s generation portfolio of resources. Wood  
25 Mackenzie produces price forecasts daily. Weekend and holiday forecasts are  
26 provided the last day before that weekend or holiday period. SDG&E has  
27 provided a record of price forecast accuracy with respect to forecasted LMP  
28 (SP15 Trading Hub and SDG&E’s DLAP) for 2025 and a comparison of forecast  
29 accuracy from the previous year in Attachment A - *2025 Summary Load Data and*

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<sup>12</sup> Formerly known as Genscape, Inc.

1 *LMP price forecasts.xls*).<sup>13</sup> Both editions of forecasted LMPs are entered into  
2 PCI to reflect updated market conditions to run the optimization model.

3 After updating the GenTrader model with these inputs, SDG&E then re-optimized the  
4 mix of market transactions and resource dispatches. As with the 12-day plan, GenTrader  
5 produced a plan for unit commitments, dispatch levels and economic purchases and sales. These  
6 results helped inform gas and power trading requirements and analyze the potential for self-  
7 scheduling of dispatchable resources.

### 8 **C. Day-Ahead Trading and Scheduling**

9 The CAISO runs the DAM to economically clear load and resources that were scheduled  
10 or bid in. The DAM required SDG&E to submit separate schedules and bids for each resource  
11 and load. Results of the DAM became financially binding at the market clearing price for each  
12 resource and load that was awarded, and the sum of SDG&E's awarded resources did not  
13 necessarily balance with SDG&E's load award. The process to self-schedule and bid in  
14 SDG&E's load and resources is discussed below.

- 15 • Load: During the record period, SDG&E began bidding a small portion of its  
16 bundled load forecast. SDG&E still sought to self-schedule the majority of the  
17 day-ahead bundled load forecast. Self-scheduling ensured that SDG&E would  
18 purchase its forecasted load requirement in the DAM rather than rolling the  
19 requirement into the real-time market which may produce more volatile prices.  
20 The DAM was preferred for two other reasons. The first reason was that SDG&E  
21 was required to self-schedule or bid in its (non-use limited) resources into the  
22 DAM under Resource Adequacy must-offer rules in the CAISO Tariff.  
23 Therefore, while balanced schedules were not mandated, the DAM did provide a  
24 means for supply revenues to effectively offset the load costs provided that

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<sup>13</sup> SDG&E has provided the best data available at the time of submittal on June 2, 2025. SDG&E will provide an updated Attachment A if there are any changes after the original submittal.

1 SDG&E self-scheduled its load in the DAM. The second reason was that the  
2 depth of the day-ahead bilateral market allowed SDG&E to hedge its self-  
3 scheduled load exposed to the CAISO DAM clearing price via market  
4 transactions.

5 The portion of forecasted load in which SDG&E elected to bid into the market  
6 rather than self-schedule was bid at prices based on the Real Time pricing  
7 forecasts provided by Wood Mackenzie. Attachment A - *2024 Summary Load*  
8 *Data and LMP Price Forecasts.xlsx* contains detailed summary load data and  
9 results.

- 10 • Non-intermittent must-take resources: SDG&E continued to self-schedule  
11 available must-take generation on a day-ahead basis to offset DAM load awards.  
12 For resources that were scheduled by sellers and not SDG&E, sellers continued to  
13 self-schedule their available generation into the DAM. Credit for the DA  
14 revenues was transferred back to SDG&E either via an Inter-SC Trade (“IST”) for  
15 the self-scheduled quantity or settled after the fact by the settlements group.
- 16 • Generation convergence bids: One of SDG&E’s intermittent resources that is a  
17 Variable Energy Resource (“VER”) was scheduled in the hour-ahead scheduling  
18 process as required by the CAISO. SDG&E utilized convergence bids to  
19 effectively shift the CAISO’s payment for this VER resource from the real-time  
20 market to the DAM, thereby providing a better offset to load charges which, as  
21 discussed above, settle against DAM prices. The Commission authorized  
22 Convergence Bidding in D.10-12-034.<sup>14</sup> The daily process consists of three main  
23 steps: (1) retrieval of the day-ahead VER forecast for the relevant resource; (2)  
24 creation of convergence bid quantities considering (a) the percentage of the day-  
25 ahead VER MW volume forecast to be shifted into the DAM, (b) convergence bid  
26 quantity limitations imposed by the CAISO and (c) reduction of quantities in  
27 hours that have expected forecasted negative returns and/or historically produced  
28 negative returns on the convergence bids SDG&E would have submitted; and (3)  
29 pricing of convergence bids such that the virtual supply was not sold at

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<sup>14</sup> D.10-12-034 allows the IOUs to recover the costs associated with Convergence Bidding in ERRA.

1 unreasonably low price levels. SDG&E’s Convergence Bidding activity for the  
2 Record Year was reported and was already approved for the first two quarters of  
3 2025 ( third quarter and fourth quarter are pending approval) in the Quarterly  
4 Compliance Reports (“QCRs”) that SDG&E submits to the Procurement Review  
5 Group as required by D.10-12-034.<sup>15</sup> The remaining VER resources in the  
6 portfolio utilized energy bids to also attempt to shift the CAISO’s payment for  
7 VER resources from the real-time market to the DAM.

- 8 • Dispatchable resources: SDG&E’s objective, with respect to self-schedules and  
9 price bids for dispatchable resources, was to maintain adherence to LCD  
10 principles. This objective was primarily met by bidding generation into the DAM  
11 at cost-based prices consistent with the LCD modeling.
- 12 • Generator price bids: Energy bids consist of three basic components - startup  
13 cost, minimum load cost and incremental energy bids. Startup and minimum load  
14 costs, which can be declared as registered or proxy, were used in the CAISO  
15 DAM. In addition, bidding rules required that incremental energy bids be  
16 monotonically increasing over the range of output. Other components of the price  
17 bid that pertained to A/S-certified units are bids for Regulation, Spinning Reserve  
18 and Non-Spinning Reserve. As discussed in Section V below, the DAM  
19 algorithm co-optimized dispatchable capacity between generation and A/S  
20 awards; and the generator was paid an amount greater than or equal to its  
21 opportunity cost of forgoing a profitable day-ahead energy sale. However, co-  
22 optimization did not consider lost energy sales in the real-time market. Therefore,  
23 SDG&E incorporated an estimate of expected real-time energy market net  
24 revenues that the A/S capacity could otherwise derive from that market.
- 25 • Battery Storage Operations: SDG&E’s battery storage bids are based on  
26 opportunity costs and operational constraints rather than traditional variable  
27 production costs. Because storage shifts energy across time, bids reflect market

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<sup>15</sup> SDG&E includes a summary of its Convergence Bidding activities in this testimony as it is seeking to recover the costs associated therewith pursuant to D.10-12-034. However, SDG&E is not seeking a compliance review of its specific Convergence Bidding activities as those have already been approved in the QCRs.

1 price expectations and the value of reserving state-of-charge for higher-priced  
2 hours.

3 To manage degradation, SDG&E typically limits storage assets to one to two full  
4 cycles per day. While CAISO may dispatch these units at any time for reliability,  
5 bid structures incorporate cycling limits and other operational parameters.

6 Most SDG&E storage resources are four-hour, short-duration batteries that  
7 primarily operate during evening peak periods when solar output declines. With  
8 the exception of maintenance or testing, all units are bid in every Day-Ahead and  
9 Real-Time hour.

10 SDG&E uses a price-based bidding approach informed by historical and  
11 forecasted Day-Ahead, Real-Time, and Ancillary Services prices, as well as  
12 distribution-circuit charging limits and Master File parameters (e.g., efficiency,  
13 capacity, and minimum state of charge). Actual daily utilization varies by market  
14 conditions, though most units complete a single deep cycle while remaining  
15 available for reliability services.

16 Battery storage represents approximately 1000 MW of the portfolio. Due to its  
17 unique characteristics and opportunity-cost structure, SDG&E performs a separate  
18 optimization analysis for these resources. Battery operation is economic only  
19 when discharge revenues exceed charging costs. Bid development considers: (1)  
20 price forecasts, (2) efficiency, (3) variable O&M, (4) state of charge, (5)  
21 charge/discharge capability, (6) cycling limits, and (7) time-based parameters.  
22 Trading and scheduling teams review all bids to ensure operational compliance  
23 before submitting them to the CAISO market.

- 24 • Power Trades: During the 2025 record period, SDG&E primarily traded day-  
25 ahead financial power to hedge the risk of unknown DAM clearing prices, and  
26 their effect on the magnitude of market awards on SDG&E's resources. Financial  
27 power was traded in lieu of physical power due to greater market liquidity but  
28 provided the same hedge. The volume of energy purchased or sold was informed  
29 by the results of the GenTrader LCD model and a position analysis spreadsheet  
30

1 developed in-house; both tools calculated SDG&E's hourly short or long position  
2 based on similar inputs and provided a more robust result of hedging needs than a  
3 single model. SDG&E traded these products on the ICE or through voice brokers  
4 to ensure competitive prices and submitted these trades for Commission review in  
5 its QCR.

6 **D. Hour-Ahead Scheduling and Real-Time Dispatch**

7 The CAISO operated the Real-Time Market ("RTM") that performed several important  
8 functions related to LCD while matching generation and demand to maintain the frequency of  
9 the grid. Like the DAM, the RTM established financially binding awards for awarded hour-  
10 ahead self-schedules and bids, but only at intertie scheduling points. In addition, the RTM  
11 enabled SDG&E to submit updated self-schedules and cost-based bids for its dispatchable  
12 resources, so the CAISO could issue incremental or decremental dispatches in the real-time  
13 market based on this updated data. SDG&E also self-scheduled its VER resources in RTM as  
14 required under VER rules. Of note, the CAISO did not allow load self-schedules and bids to be  
15 updated in RTM; any differences between actual load and the load quantity cleared in the DAM  
16 were automatically settled at the real-time market price.

17 The CAISO issued incremental and decremental awards an hour before delivery for  
18 intertie bids and in real-time (5 to 15 minutes ahead) for online or fast-start internal generation  
19 through its Automated Dispatch System ("ADS"). Decremental energy awards essentially  
20 caused resources to buy back the day-ahead award if the RTM or real-time price fell below the  
21 bid price submitted in RTM; incremental awards caused resources to sell additional energy or  
22 A/S relative to the day-ahead award. SDG&E's resources responded directly to these ADS  
23 instructions. If a resource experienced an unplanned outage or other change in operational  
24 capability, these updates were submitted to the CAISO via OMS as required to notify the CAISO  
25 of the status and preclude infeasible real-time dispatch instructions.

1 Because real-time prices are historically more volatile than, and can deviate significantly  
2 from, the day-ahead price, the impact of the real-time market on SDG&E's LCD results varied  
3 day-to-day. This impact could be particularly negative if real-time market prices spiked when  
4 SDG&E's portfolio was significantly short. The short position could arise for several reasons,  
5 including:

- 6 • SDG&E generally self-scheduled 100% of its forecasted load in the DAM; if  
7 actual load exceeded the forecast, the result was a short real-time position;
- 8 • Resources (must-take and dispatchable) that were awarded in the DAM carried a  
9 delivery obligation in the real-time market for the awarded quantity; thus, an  
10 outage or curtailment to any of these resources that prevented it from meeting its  
11 day-ahead obligation resulted in a short real-time position;
- 12 • Awarded convergence bids in the DAM triggered a buyback in the real-time  
13 market; if this buyback was not fully covered by physical generation, the  
14 convergence bid resulted in a short real-time position; and
- 15 • If real-time prices were lower than day-ahead, the CAISO could dispatch  
16 resources below their day-ahead award, as described earlier in this section; these  
17 decremental dispatches would result in a short real-time position (albeit a  
18 desirable one should real-time prices continue to remain low).

19 If real-time prices spiked under any one or more of these scenarios, SDG&E's  
20 dispatchable resources may not have been able to ramp quickly enough to fully eliminate the  
21 short position. The combination of real-time price spikes and short portfolio position was and  
22 continues to be a constant risk to ratepayers, depending on the severity of each.

#### 23 **E. Award Retrieval and Validation**

24 SDG&E retrieved CAISO day-ahead awards and communicated them to its resources.  
25 While dispatchable generators in fact respond to CAISO ADS or regulation dispatch in real-time,  
26 they required timely notice of day-ahead awards in order to adequately prepare to meet startup,

1 shutdown and MSG transition requirements. Furthermore, advance notification of regulation  
2 awards ensured that generators would be prepared to operate in Automated Generation Control  
3 (“AGC”) in order to follow regulation dispatch. Lastly, the day-ahead notification allowed  
4 enough time to address any inconsistencies between a generator’s day-ahead award and its stated  
5 operational constraints previously communicated to the CAISO through OMS.

6         SDG&E performed a post-market assessment to review market results and validate that  
7 the CAISO process resulted in LCD of SDG&E’s portfolio. The assessment is referred to as the  
8 Bid Evaluator report, provided through the PCI software package. Bid Evaluator compared  
9 SDG&E’s expected day-ahead awards for its dispatchable generation based on published market  
10 prices with actual DAM results. Generally, the market results aligned closely with Bid Evaluator  
11 results (subject to operational constraints), confirming that LCD of SDG&E’s portfolio was  
12 achieved.

13         Although SDG&E investigated substantive deviations between CAISO market solutions  
14 and Bid Evaluator optimization, any deviations did not necessarily indicate an incorrect dispatch  
15 or need for further action. Upon citing a deviation, SDG&E could modify inputs or bidding  
16 strategy, initiate a change proposal to PCI for development, or notify CAISO of deviations to  
17 determine the cause which may be recognized as a market flaw through Customer Inquiry  
18 Dispute and Information (“CIDI”) tickets.

## 19 **VI. CONSTRAINTS TO LEAST-COST DISPATCH**

20         As stated in the discussion of LCD principles, SDG&E performed its LCD activities  
21 within limits established by numerous types of constraints that range from operational,  
22 regulatory and contractual to risk mitigation and market conditions. An after-the-fact review of a  
23 particular day’s dispatch may show a deviation from LCD because of the effects of such  
24 constraints.

1           Some constraints were operating limits inherent to the resources in the portfolio. For  
2 example, generators cannot continually cycle back and forth between online and offline because  
3 of minimum run time and shutdown time of each combustion turbine. Therefore, the lowest cost  
4 unit may not have been dispatched if adequate time for startup was not available. Some other  
5 common examples of LCD constraints include, but are not limited to, the following:

- 6           •       Exceptional Dispatch (“ED”) is a form of dispatch the CAISO relies on to meet  
7 reliability requirements that cannot be resolved through market processes. The  
8 CAISO orders EDs to address local generation requirements, system capacity  
9 needs, transmission outages, software limitations and other operational issues.  
10 Because EDs are reliability-driven, they are outside the scope of LCD and likely  
11 to be uneconomic relative to market prices or other resources. All CAISO  
12 resources are obligated to comply with these dispatches.
- 13           •       Residual Unit Commitment (“RUC”) is a market award for capacity, which the  
14 CAISO issues to ensure that sufficient capacity is committed to meet system load.  
15 Although RUC resulted from the market process, it is required to manage grid  
16 reliability and is outside the scope of LCD. SDG&E resources were obligated to  
17 be available to provide the RUC capacity if awarded, which required that they  
18 could be committed uneconomically relative to other resources.
- 19           •       Unit testing and maintenance, such as Relative Accuracy Test Audit (“RATA”)  
20 tests and heat treats, require generators to run at pre-defined load points to achieve  
21 an objective. During these periods, generation is considered must-take and cannot  
22 be dispatched according to LCD economics.
- 23           •       Constrained pipeline operations may impact LCD. A generator may be  
24 constrained in its ability to provide real-time dispatch because of limited gas  
25 balancing rights on a pipeline. Another example of pipeline constraints was  
26 Operational Flow Orders (“OFOs”). An OFO occurs when the anticipated  
27 deliveries in a gas system such as Southern California Gas Company  
28 (“SoCalGas”) are greater than the maximum forecasted capacity or less than the  
29 minimum forecasted capacity of the system for a given day. These two scenarios

1 can result in either a high inventory OFO or a low inventory OFO and can impact  
2 dispatch decisions. Under a high inventory OFO, if a resource fails to consume  
3 the required designated percentage of its delivered natural gas quantity, the  
4 pipeline will assess penalties. Under a low inventory OFO, if a resource fails to  
5 deliver the designated minimum percentage of its natural gas quantity, the  
6 pipeline will assess penalties. These scenarios may constrain resources from  
7 decreasing or increasing generation in response to prices.

- 8 • Use-limited resources are resources that are only available for a limited number of  
9 hours or starts per period. For example, annual environmental restrictions limit  
10 the number of startups on certain combustion turbines. Other resources that were  
11 use-limited include Demand Response programs that can be triggered for limited  
12 hours each month.
- 13 • CAISO market solutions look at 24-hour time horizons and to come up with the  
14 most economic “system” solution, individual resources may need to be awarded  
15 uneconomically or may not be awarded even though a specific resource may  
16 appear to be economical with respect to its clearing prices to satisfy specific  
17 reliability requirements. Therefore, LCD is achieved on a system basis while  
18 satisfying unique transmission and reliability constraints as opposed to evaluating  
19 an individual unit on an hour by hour basis.

## 20 **VII. SUMMARY REPORTS AND TABLES**

21 In this Section, SDG&E provides additional detailed information that support SDG&E’s  
22 execution of the LCD process during 2025, as described in Section V. The following provides a  
23 description of information provided as well as tables which summarize annual exceptions for  
24 incremental cost bid calculations, self-commitment decisions and Master File data changes:

- 25 1. Incremental Cost Bid - Incremental bids submitted to the CAISO are calculated  
26 using the heat rate, fuel costs, fuel transportation fees, GHG costs, and variable  
27 operations and maintenance costs and any other costs used in the calculation. For  
28 the record period, the annual and monthly tables below provide a listing of all  
29 variances between calculated and submitted bids that are greater than \$0.10 and

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the related cost impacts. In addition, the table provides any occurrences where dispatchable resources were not bid into the CAISO markets when available. Attachment B – 2025 *Incremental Bid Cost Calculations.xlsx* provides details of incremental bids submitted to the CAISO and any potential exceptions. Potential reasons for LMP clearing higher than incremental bid costs include but are not limited to the consideration of start-up and minimum load costs, MIP (“Mixed Integer Processing”) gap, inter-temporal constraints, transmission constraints, conditions used as initial conditions for next day and the effect of adjacent balancing authorities’ areas.



Summary of 2025 Self Schedules								
Month	1) Self	2) Market Awards	3) Self Schedule	4) Self Schedule	5) Revenue - Costs for	6) Bid Cost	7) Revenues	8) Revenue - Costs
January								
February								
March								
April								
May								
June								
July								
August								
September								
October								
November								
December								
2020 Total								

1

Table 3-b Summary of 2025 Hypothetical Non-Self Schedules			
Month	1) Estimated	2) Estimated	3) Estimated
January			
February			
March			
April			
May			
June			
July			
August			
September			
October			
November			
December			
2020 Total			

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- 3        2.    Master File Data Changes – SDG&E can change Master File submissions to
- 4        reflect Proxy or Registered Start-Up or Minimum Load costs for its dispatchable
- 5        resources depending on market conditions. In 2025, SDG&E solely submitted
- 6        Proxy costs for its dispatchable resources. Table 4, the annual table below,
- 7        summarizes the number of times and the reasons for selecting proxy or registered
- 8        costs. In addition, the tables provide the frequency of calculations that differed
- 9        from values submitted to the CAISO, and the cost impacts, by month.
- 10       Attachment E – 2025 *Master File (RDT) Change Exceptions.xlsx* provides the
- 11       details of changes made during the record period. Table 4 below summarizes
- 12       proxy and registered cost change exceptions.

**Table 4**  
**Summary of 2025 PROXY and Registered Cost Change Exceptions**

Category	Proxy Elections	Registered Elections	Incorrect Submissions	Error Rate
Startup	13	0	0	0%
Minload	13	0	0	0%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0%</b>

1  
2 **VIII. MARKET DESIGN AND PROCESS CHANGES**

3           The following is a summary of certain CAISO market design changes that may have  
4 affected SDG&E’s business processes during 2025:

- 5           1.     Price Formation Enhancements – Soft Offer Bid Cap: This initiative raised the  
6 real-time market soft offer cap for energy storage and hydro resources that use the  
7 Non-Generator Resource model from \$1,000 to \$2,000, which will allow these  
8 resources to bid above their Default Energy Bids under certain conditions. This  
9 change aligns CAISO’s real-time soft offer cap with those of external resources.
- 10                 • This policy change will allow CAISO resources to better reflect intra-day  
11 opportunity costs and prevent premature dispatch during stressed grid  
12 conditions, as well as allow resources to better maintain their day-ahead  
13 market schedules when real-time prices exceed the soft-offer cap.
- 14           2.     Bid Cost Recovery Rules for Storage Resources - This initiative changed the  
15 calculation for Bid Cost Recovery to ensure that storage resources are more  
16 exposed to real-time prices.
- 17                 • This change would allow for the use of a proxy value to represent a  
18 storage resource’s real-time energy bid cost based on the market dispatch  
19 of that resource in the 15-minute and five-minute market in relation to the  
20 resource’s market award in the day-ahead market or the 15-minute market,  
21 respectively. These proxy values apply to storage resources in all real-  
22 time market intervals. By using these values in the BCR calculation, the  
23 risk of unwarranted real-time bid cost recovery payments will be mitigated

1 and the incentive for scheduling coordinators to engage in strategic  
2 bidding for storage resources will be reduced.

- 3 3. Interconnection Process Enhancements Phase 2 - This phase of the IPE initiative  
4 built on Phase 1, which enacted near-term adjustments to the Cluster 15 study  
5 schedule. Phase 2 introduced a new scoring criterion into the interconnection  
6 process, emphasizing project readiness and competition for projects to advance to  
7 the study stage.
- 8 • Developed a system to score projects based on indicators related to  
9 commercial interest, project viability, and system need. Allowed CAISO  
10 to consider preliminary and non-binding interest allocations from LSEs  
11 who are interested in indicating interest in specific projects. These  
12 commercial interest selections improve the scores of those projects,  
13 increasing the likelihood of those projects advancing to the study process  
14 and competing for transmission plan deliverability.
- 15 4. West-Wide Governance Pathways Initiative - This effort was launched summer  
16 2023 by a coalition of regulators to develop a proposal for continued evolution of  
17 governance over Western EIM and EDAM. CAISO then approved the Step 1  
18 Recommendation for governance changes, which outlined changes to the scope of  
19 primary authority of the Governing Body and the trigger mechanism for making  
20 these changes.
- 21 5. Inter-SC Trades in Regional Markets - On September 26th, CAISO approved a  
22 proposal to extend inter-SC trade of energy feature to WEIM and EDAM  
23 balancing areas.
- 24 • Inter-SC trades are an optional market feature facilitating  
25 settlement of aspects of bilateral contracts between scheduling  
26 coordinators. Additionally, Inter-SC trades have no effect on  
27 market optimization, schedules, or dispatch.
- 28 6. EDAM ISO BAA Participation Rules - Through this initiative, CAISO addressed  
29 ISO-BAA specific elements required for EDAM participation, including how to

1 allocate EDAM resource sufficiency evaluation (RSE) failure surcharges and  
2 revenues, and options for curing ISO BAA EDAM advisory RSE shortfalls.

- 3 • CAISO reviewed their methodology for recovering revenue for  
4 each of the three categories outlined by the EDAM design: (1)  
5 Historical short-term firm/non-firm transmission sales (for ISO it is  
6 the wheeling access charge); (2) Portion of new transmission  
7 upgrades increasing transfer capability between EDAM areas; and  
8 (3) Transmission costs associated with net EDAM wheel through  
9 transfers.
- 10 • For CAISO, the BAAs EDAM Access Charge Revenue will be sub  
11 allocated to PTOs in proportion to their EDAM Recoverable  
12 Revenue in relationship to CAISO BAA EDAM Recoverable  
13 Revenue. These changes were adopted, but will be implemented  
14 following EDAM go-live in 2026.

## 15 **IX. ANNUAL TABLE**

16 The following table summarizes, by resource type, the total capacity bid or self-scheduled  
17 into the market as well as capacity lost due to planned or forced outages. The table also includes  
18 total energy awards for each resource broken down by self-schedules versus market awards.  
19 Attachment F - *2025 Annual Summary.xlsx* provides the details of dispatchable and non-  
20 dispatchable resources. Table 5 is an annual summary of dispatchable and non-dispatchable  
21 resources including capacity available and unavailable, self-schedules and DAM awards.

Table 5 Background Summary- 2025 Annual Summary						
Dispatchable	Resource Type	Capacity (PMAx in MWh)	Unavailable Capacity (MWh)	DA SS Awards (MWh)	Award due to Market	Total Awards
Dispatchable	Battery - Energy Storage	5,191,524	707,204	(4,833)	(197,483)	(287,942)
Dispatchable	Natural Gas Generation	19,960,893	5,534,526	79,737	1,607,243	1,686,980
Dispatchable	Pump Hydro	-	-	-	-	-
Dispatchable	Hybrid	69,100	1,114	17,822	33,876	51,697
Non-Dispatchable	Resource Type	Capacity (PMAx in MWh)	Unavailable Capacity (MWh)	DA SS Awards (MWh)	Award due to Market	Total Awards
Non-Dispatchable	BioGas	70,080	606	42,660	-	42,660
Non-Dispatchable	Gas Turbine	298,891	43,707	194,773	-	194,773
Non-Dispatchable	Natural Gas Generation	-	-	-	-	-
Non-Dispatchable	Other	17,520	-	2,160	-	2,160
Non-Dispatchable	Solar	10,527,576	241,248	3,819	2,211,413	2,215,232
Non-Dispatchable	Steam Turbine	-	-	-	-	-
Non-Dispatchable	Wind	6,297,813	599,000	91	1,399,467	1,399,559
<b>Total</b>		<b>42,433,398</b>	<b>7,127,404</b>	<b>336,229</b>	<b>5,054,516</b>	<b>5,305,119</b>

## X. FUEL PROCUREMENT

During the record period, SDG&E supplied fuel for gas-fired, dispatchable resources in the portfolio. SDG&E performed as the pipeline-registered Fuel Manager and Fuel Supplier for most of its dispatchable resources. These included SDG&E-owned or -contracted resources (Miramar, Cuyamaca, Palomar, Desert Star, Orange Grove, Carlsbad, Pio Pico, Escondido Energy Center, El Cajon Energy Center and Goal Line). The fuel costs for Miramar, Cuyamaca, Palomar, Desert Star, El Cajon Energy Center and Orange Grove are charged to SDG&E's Portfolio Allocation Balancing Account ("PABA") balancing account in the appropriate resource vintages with the exception of Goal Line which is charged to SDG&E's Transition Cost Balancing Account ("TCBA"). The fuel costs for Pio Pico Energy Center, Carlsbad Energy Center, and Escondido Energy Center are charged to the Local Generating Balancing Account ("LGBA").

As discussed in the Commission-approved BPP, SDG&E's procurement process is to secure approximately 90% of forecasted fuel volumes as firm monthly baseload supply. The

1 advantages of baseload supply are that: (1) it shields ratepayers from potentially volatile day-  
2 ahead natural gas prices; (2) it is scheduled by market participants as a higher priority delivery  
3 than day-ahead supply; and (3) it reduces the day-to-day trading and scheduling requirements,  
4 thereby reducing overall operational requirements. While the cost of baseload supply may be  
5 lower or higher than the spot price on any given day, over time, these price differentials average  
6 toward zero, leaving SDG&E with the benefits cited above.

7           While most fuel supply was procured as firm monthly baseload, during the Record Year,  
8 SDG&E used prevailing day-ahead or intra-day market prices to price out day-ahead or intra-day  
9 generation costs, which is consistent with LCD. For example, if the portfolio was short fuel,  
10 relative to day-ahead requirements, fuels traders purchased incremental supply at the DAM price.  
11 Or, if the portfolio was long on fuel relative to real-time requirements, fuels traders sold the  
12 surplus baseload supply at the same-day market price. This coordination between fuel and  
13 power trading enabled SDG&E to accurately price variable generation costs so that the benefits  
14 of market transactions could be properly evaluated. Both baseload and daily natural gas trades  
15 for the record period were executed at competitive prevailing market prices and in compliance  
16 with the BPP. All SDG&E natural gas transactions for 2025 were reported and are reviewed by  
17 the Commission in SDG&E's QCR under the advice letters cited in Section I, above.

18           During the record period, SDG&E held Backbone Transportation Service ("BTS") to  
19 transport natural gas from the various SoCal Border trading points to the SoCal Citygate.  
20 SDG&E acquired the rights to BTS capacity from SoCalGas pipeline to increase the priority of  
21 fuel delivery to its dispatchable resources. The decision to acquire the rights to BTS is  
22 determined by several factors including: the price spread between the SoCal Border point and  
23 the SoCal Citygate, the quantity of BTS offered by SoCalGas, and if SDG&E has purchased

1 Firm Interstate capacity that can feed into specific SoCal BTS points. Firm Interstate capacity  
2 represent fixed costs and therefore are not considered in the LCD process.

3 The CAISO's DAM process creates uncertainty of gas quantities to be traded in the  
4 DAM. Day-ahead generation awards are not known until approximately 1:00 p.m. PST, well  
5 after the next-day natural gas markets have finished trading. Because of the time lag, fuels  
6 traders need to rely on generation award forecasts and judgment to establish their next-day fuel  
7 position. When actual results deviated from forecasted fuel quantities, fuels traders primarily  
8 relied on gas balancing services offered on SoCalGas' system and, the Kern and Southwest Gas  
9 pipelines. SDG&E also traded and/or scheduled gas supplies in later pipeline scheduling cycles  
10 to avoid potential imbalance penalties. Activity in these later scheduling cycles was avoided to  
11 the extent lower availability of competitive bids and offers caused incremental transactions to  
12 cost more to SDG&E.

### 13 **XI. DEMAND RESPONSE**

14 SDG&E has developed and offered a variety of Demand Response ("DR") programs to  
15 its customers since 2001. The scope of these programs has changed as the concept of DR has  
16 evolved and has become an integral part of resource planning and energy management. DR  
17 programs have design objectives (reliability, economic, emergency, etc.) as well as specific  
18 tariffs or guidelines which describe set trigger conditions such as heat rate, system load,  
19 temperature forecast and/or emergency conditions. When triggers are met, SDG&E has  
20 discretion to dispatch a program, which allows SDG&E to assure event hours are available for  
21 times of greater need and optimize the value of the programs.

22 During the record period, SDG&E utilized its DR programs primarily to reduce  
23 electricity consumption during peak demand or to respond to system reliability needs. SDG&E's  
24 portfolio consists of programs that have economic triggers as well as programs with all non-

1 economic triggers. Pursuant to D.15-05-005, as discussed above,<sup>16</sup> SDG&E’s Capacity Bidding  
2 Program (“CBP”)<sup>17</sup> is subject to the LCD standard as it has economic triggers and has been bid  
3 into the CAISO market during 2025. In the remainder of this section, SDG&E provides  
4 information pertaining to the CBP program in SDG&E’s DR portfolio and explains how the  
5 program was utilized in 2025.

6 **A. Capacity Bidding Program**

7 Capacity Bidding Program (“CBP”) is a voluntary Demand Response program available  
8 to all commercial and industrial customers in the SDG&E’s territory. CBP operational period is  
9 from May 1<sup>st</sup> to October 31<sup>st</sup> each year. Program operation hours are Monday through Saturday,  
10 excluding holidays, from 1 P.M. to 9 P.M. Participants receive a monthly capacity payment in  
11 exchange for reducing their load when requested by the utility. Participating customers who are  
12 also receiving bundled services from SDG&E receive an additional energy payment during CBP  
13 events.

14 CBP participating customers can choose to participate in one of two CBP products: (1)  
15 CBP Elect Day-Ahead, and (2) CBP Elect Day-Of. The distinction between the product types is  
16 the pre-event notification timing. Under the Day-Ahead Product, customers are notified by no  
17 later than 5 P.M. the day prior to the actual event. The Day-Of Product, provides event  
18 notification forty minutes prior to the start of the event. SDG&E continues to bid all products in  
19 the day-ahead CAISO market because the CAISO has limitations on dispatching in real time.

20 CBP is capped at 24 events per product and six times per month in May through October.  
21 The following is a list of CBP programs and triggers:

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<sup>16</sup> See RA-2 above.

<sup>17</sup> D.16.-06-029 in conjunction with AL 3050-E-A and AL 3050-E-B approved on July 21, 2017 and effective January 1, 2017.

- 1 • There are three Day-Ahead price triggers for Elect options:
- 2 • Elect option 1 = \$200 1-9pm Day-Ahead
- 3 • Elect option 2 = \$400 1-9pm Day-Ahead
- 4 • Elect option 3 = \$600 1-9pm Day-Ahead
- 5 • There are three Day-Of price triggers for Elect options:
- 6 • Elect option 1 = \$200 1-9pm Day-Of
- 7 • Elect option 2 = \$400 1-9pm Day-Of
- 8 • Elect option 3 = \$600 1-9pm Day-Of
- 9 • SDG&E may call an event if SDG&E system conditions warrant; or
- 10 • At the request of CAISO as a result of a declared emergency<sup>18</sup>

11 Although the CBP tariff outlines program triggers, SDG&E is not required to dispatch the  
12 CBP program every time the economic trigger is reached. Therefore, SDG&E takes forecasted  
13 system demand, program limitations, and customer fatigue into account before making a final  
14 decision about dispatching the program.

15 The CBP Elect options were bid in based on the election price of \$200, \$400, or \$600.  
16 CBP DA 1pm-9pm elect 600 was the only active program in 2025.

17 The CBP DA 1pm-9pm elect \$600 option was solely activated for testing on two (2)  
18 occasions during the 2025 event season as triggers were never met during the 2025 year. The two  
19 test events were held on 08/22/2025 and 09/23/2025.

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<sup>18</sup> **Emergency Only Events:** An Emergency Only Event is defined as an event that is called due to a CAISO alert or local Utility emergency when the program would not otherwise be available. For example, events called on Sundays, Holidays or after the maximum events per month has been reached will be considered Emergency Only Events. There is no limit on the number of Emergency Only Events called due to CAISO Alerts and/or CAISO Emergencies and for Utility system emergencies.

1           **B.     Demand Response Metrics**

2           In D.14-05-025, the Commission approved various reporting requirements proposed by  
3 Cal PA. The following discussion outlines those requirements as well as the manner in which  
4 SDG&E responded to them for Record Year 2025.

- 5           1.     An annual summary of the results of the reporting requirement (related to dispatch  
6           of DR resources) adopted in D.14-05-025. At a minimum, the utilities should  
7           provide a summary of:
- 8           a.     The times and duration that all programs were dispatched;
  - 9           b.     All cases where the DR program’s trigger conditions were forecast to be  
10           met, and all cases where these trigger conditions were met;
  - 11           c.     A list of occurrences when DR resources should have been dispatched but  
12           were not (*i.e.*, a DR resource’s economic trigger conditions were forecast  
13           by the utility, but it was not dispatched). Each occurrence should be  
14           accompanied by an explanation detailing the reason for non-dispatch.
- 15          2.     In addition to the Reporting Requirement in D.14-05-025, a calculation should be  
16           provided of the number of hours when the utility forecasts that trigger criteria  
17           will be reached, as a percentage of hours in which trigger conditions were  
18           reached in the same time period (monthly and annual basis).
- 19          3.     The total energy dispatched as a proportion of maximum available energy for  
20           each DR program under scope of the proceeding (monthly and annual  
21           breakdowns). This comparison should be provided in both percentage and  
22           nominal (MWh) terms. An example of the format is provided below:
- 23           a.     In 2025 record year, utility A’s CBP program dispatched 100 MWh. This  
24           is compared to a total maximum available dispatch of 200 MWh for that  
25           program.
  - 26           b.     Therefore, utility A’s CBP program did not dispatch 100 MWh of its total  
27           maximum available energy.
  - 28           c.     In 2025 record year, utility A dispatched 50% of the available energy in  
29           the CBP program.
- 30          4.     For each event the full capacity was not dispatched, an explanation should be

1 provided as to why the DR resource was not dispatched to its maximum  
2 availability during the record period.

- 3 5. If the metrics in (3.) above show that available energy was not dispatched for a  
4 program, provide an estimate of the net cost impact on overall resource dispatch  
5 of not utilizing maximum available amounts when the program triggers have  
6 been forecasted to be reached. This metric should focus on the net cost of  
7 dispatching metric (3)(b).
- 8 6. Metrics should be provided by the utility to identify whether the selection of DR  
9 events called minimized the utility's overall portfolio costs of dispatching supply  
10 resources. This assessment should include the average hourly net cost impact by  
11 program.
  - 12 a. For events dispatched in the record year.
  - 13 b. For all time periods when DR program triggers were forecasted by the  
14 utility (whether dispatched or not).
  - 15 c. Comparison of a) and b) in both percentages and nominal (MWh) terms.
- 16 7. An explanation of how opportunity cost analyses were used to make the decision  
17 to call or not call an event. This should include an explanation of the  
18 opportunity cost methodology and demonstration of its application.

19 SDG&E has reviewed the preceding requirements, and in the following, discusses how  
20 the metrics SDG&E supplied in the accompanying attachments to this testimony for record  
21 period 2025 comply with these requirements.

- 22 1. Attachment G - *2025 ERRA Demand Response Metric 1.xlsx* provides CBP  
23 summary results of when program was dispatched, when trigger conditions were  
24 forecasted and/or met, a list of occurrences when CBP was not dispatched but hit  
25 triggers, as well as the reason for non-dispatch.
- 26 2. In the 2025 record period, SDG&E used the DAM clearing prices as the forecast  
27 trigger criteria for CBP Day-Ahead because the deadline to call the event is after  
28 the Day-Ahead final schedules are published. With respect to CBP Day-Of,  
29 SDG&E used the published DAM clearing prices and other real-time market  
30 conditions to determine if the CBP Day-Of should have been dispatched but did

1 not forecast price triggers. As a result, the hours when the utility forecasts the  
2 trigger will be the same as the number of hours when the trigger conditions were  
3 met and no further data was provided.

- 4 3. *Attachment H - 2025 ERRR Demand Response Metric 2.xlsx* provides CBP  
5 summary results of total energy dispatched as a proportion of the maximum  
6 available energy for CBP Day-Ahead and Day-Of. The comparison provides the  
7 metric in percentage and nominal (MWh) terms.
- 8 4. *Attachment G - 2025 ERRR Demand Response Metric 1.xlsx* provides an  
9 explanation when CBP was not dispatched but hit triggers. CBP Day-Ahead  
10 Product and Day-Of was dispatched to full capacity each time SDG&E triggered  
11 an event.
- 12 5. *Attachment I - 2025 ERRR Demand Response Metric 5.xlsx* provides a net cost  
13 impact of CBP Day-Ahead and Day-Of when triggers were met and resource  
14 was not dispatched to its maximum available capacity.
- 15 6. *Attachment J - 2025 ERRR Demand Response Metric 6* provides the average  
16 hourly net cost CBP events called in the 2025 record period compared to the  
17 average hourly potential next cost from all times when trigger conditions were  
18 forecast (Dispatched or Not).
- 19 7. As described above in Section X, SDG&E utilized its DR programs during the  
20 record period primarily to reduce electricity consumption during peak demand or  
21 in response to system reliability needs. The instances in which SDG&E did not  
22 call events when triggers were met, were based on a combination of current  
23 system needs, and the benefit of reserving the resource to provide for a greater  
24 system need.

## 25 **XII. CONCLUSION**

26 My prepared direct testimony describes SDG&E's plans and processes used during the  
27 record period for serving load from its fully integrated portfolio of utility-owned resources,  
28 power purchase contracts and market transactions, consistent with the Commission-approved  
29 BPP in effect. SDG&E consistently complied with applicable Commission's decisions

1 addressing LCD requirements for the 2025 record period. In summary, SDG&E's LCD  
2 processes are fully consistent with and satisfied the Commission's requirements by considering  
3 variable costs and utilizing the lowest-cost resource mix, subject to constraints in the day-ahead,  
4 hour-ahead and real-time markets. Therefore, SDG&E requests that the Commission find that  
5 SDG&E demonstrated compliance with the Commission's LCD and SOC 4 standards during the  
6 2025 record period.

7 This concludes my prepared direct testimony.

1 **XIII. QUALIFICATIONS**

2 My name is Andrew Scates. My business address is 8315 Century Park Court, San  
3 Diego, CA 92123. I am currently employed by SDG&E as a Market Operations Manager. My  
4 responsibilities include overseeing a staff of schedulers involved in dispatching the SDG&E  
5 bundled load portfolio of supply assets for the benefit of retail electric customers. This includes  
6 transacting in the real-time wholesale market and managing scheduling activities in compliance  
7 with CAISO requirements. I assumed my current position in January 2011.

8 I previously managed the Electric Fuels Trading desks for SDG&E, primarily managing  
9 day ahead and forward procurement of Natural Gas. Prior to joining SDG&E in 2003, my  
10 experience included five years as an energy trader/scheduling manager.

11 I hold a Bachelors degree in Business Administration with an emphasis in Finance from  
12 California State University, Chico.

13 I have previously testified before the Commission

**ATTACHMENT A**

**2025 SUMMARY LOAD DATA AND LMP PRICE FORECASTS.XLSX**

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**ATTACHMENT B**

**2025 INCREMENTAL BID COST CALCULATIONS.XSLX**

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**ATTACHMENT C**

**2025 SELF SCHEDULES SUPPORTING DATA 1.XLSX**

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**ATTACHMENT D**

**2025 SELF SCHEDULES SUPPORTING DATA 2.XLSX**

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**ATTACHMENT E**

**2025 MASTER FILE (RDT) CHANGE EXCEPTIONS.XLSX**

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**ATTACHMENT F**

**2025 ANNUAL SUMMARY.XLSX**

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**ATTACHMENT G**

**2025 ERRR DEMAND RESPONSE METRIC 1.XSLX**

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**ATTACHMENT H**

**2025 ERRR DEMAND RESPONSE METRIC .XSLX**

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**ATTACHMENT I**

**2025 ERRR DEMAND RESPONSE METRIC 5.XSLX**

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**ATTACHMENT J**

**2025 ERRR DEMAND RESPONSE METRIC 6.XSLX**

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**ATTACHMENT K**

**CONFIDENTIALITY DECLARATION OF ANDREW SCATES**

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES  
COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF  
CALIFORNIA

DECLARATION  
OF Andrew Scates

A.26-06-

Application of San Diego Gas & Electric Company (U 902-E) for Approval of: (i) Contract Administration, Least Cost Dispatch and Power Procurement Activities in 2025, (ii) Costs Related to those Activities Recorded to the Energy Resource Recovery Account and Transition Cost Balancing Account in 2025 and (iii) Costs Recorded in Related Regulatory Accounts in 2025

I, Andrew Scates, do declare as follows:

1. I am the Market Operations Manager for San Diego Gas & Electric Company ("SDG&E"). I have included my Direct Testimony ("Testimony") in support of SDG&E's Application for Approval of: (i) Contract Administration, Least Cost Dispatch and Power Procurement Activities, and (ii) Costs Related to those Activities Recorded to the Energy Resource Recovery Account, incurred during the Record Period January 1, 2025 through December 31, 2025, and (iii) the Entries Recorded in Related Regulatory Accounts. Additionally, as Market Operations Manager, I am thoroughly familiar with the facts and representations in this declaration and if called upon to testify I could and would testify to the following based upon personal knowledge.

2. I am providing this Declaration to demonstrate that the confidential information ("Protected Information") in support of the referenced Application falls within the scope of data provided confidential treatment in the IOU Matrix ("Matrix") attached to the Commission's Decision D.06-06-066 (the Phase I Confidentiality decision). Pursuant to the procedures adopted in D.08-04-023, I am addressing each of the following five features of Ordering Paragraph 2 in D.06-06-066:

- that the material constitutes a particular type of data listed in the Matrix;
- the category or categories in the Matrix the data correspond to;
- that SDG&E is complying with the limitations on confidentiality specified in the Matrix for that type of data;
- that the information is not already public; and
- that the data cannot be aggregated, redacted, summarized, masked or otherwise protected in a way that allows partial disclosure.

3. The Protected Information contained in my Testimony constitutes material, market sensitive, electric procurement-related information that is within the scope of Section 454.5(g) of the Public Utilities Code.] As such, the Protected Information provided by SDG&E is allowed confidential treatment in accordance with Appendix 1 - IOU Matrix in D.06-06-066.

Confidential Information	Matrix Reference	Reason for Confidentiality
Table 2- Column Cost Impact	XI	Monthly Procurement Costs (Energy Resource Recovery Account), Confidential for three years
Table 3-a Table 3-b	XI	Monthly Procurement Costs
Attachment A	VI.B XI II.A.2	Utility Bundled Net Open Position for Energy (for MWh), Confidential front three years Monthly Procurement Costs Utility Electric Price Forecast, Confidential for three years
Attachment B	II.B XI	Utility Retained Generation (URG) Confidential for three years Monthly Procurement Costs
Attachment C, D	XI	Monthly Procurement Costs
Attachment E	IV.A	Forecast of IOU Generation Resources

Attachment F	XI	Monthly Procurement Costs
	VI.B	Utility Bundled Net Open Position for Energy (for MWh)

4. I am not aware of any instances where the Protected Information has been disclosed to the public. To my knowledge, no party, including SDG&E, has publicly revealed any of the Protected Information.

5. I will comply with the limitations on confidentiality specified in the Matrix for the Protected Information.

6. The Protected Information cannot be provided in a form that is aggregated, partially redacted, or summarized, masked or otherwise protected in a manner that would allow further disclosure of the data while still protecting confidential information.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 20th Day of May, 2026, at San Diego, California.

*/s/Andrew Scates*

## ACRONYM GLOSSARY

A/S	Ancillary Services
ADS	Automated Dispatch System
AL	Advice Letter
BCR	Bid Cost Recovery
BIP	Base Interruptible Program
BPP	Bundled Procurement Plan
BTS	Backbone Transportation Service
CAISO	California Independent System Operator
CAL PA	California Public Advocates Office
CBP	Capacity Bidding Program
CCGT	Combined Cycle Gas Turbine
CIDI	Customer Inquiry Dispute and Information
CPUC	California Public Utilities Commission
CT	Combustion Turbines
D	Decision
DA	Day Ahead
DAM	Day Ahead Market
DLAP	Default Load Aggregation Point
DR	Demand Response
DSEC	Desert Star Energy Center
ECEC	El Cajon Energy Center
ED	Exceptional Dispatch
EEC	Escondido Energy Center
ERRA	Energy Resource Recovery Account
ES&D	Energy Supply and Dispatch
FERC	Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
HASP	Hour-Ahead Scheduling Process
ICE	Intercontinental Exchange
IFM	Integrated Forward Market
IST	Inter-SC Trade
LCD	Least Cost Dispatch
LMP	Locational Marginal Price
LSE	Load Serving Entity
LTPP	Long Term Procurement Plan
LTSA	Long Term Service Agreement
MIP	Mixed Integer Processing
MRTU	Market Redesign Technology Upgrade
MSG	Multi-stage Generation
MW	Megawatt
NGI	National Gas Intelligence
NGR	Non-generating Resources
Non-spin	Non-spinning Reserve

NYMEX	New York Mercantile Exchange
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OFO	Operational Flow Order
OG	Orange Grove
OMEC	Otay Mesa Energy Center
OMS	Outage Management System
ORA	Office of Ratepayer Advocates (Now California Public Advocates Office)
OTC	Over-the-counter
PCI	Power Costs Inc.
PDR	Proxy Demand Response
PEC	Palomar Energy Center
Pnode	Pricing Node
PPA	Power Purchase Agreement
PRG	Procurement Review Group
PRT	Pattern Recognition Technologies
QCR	Quarterly Compliance Report
QF	Qualifying Facility
RA	Resource Adequacy
RATA	Relative Accuracy Test
RD	Regulation Down
RDRR	Reliability Demand Response Resource
RDT	Resource Data Template or Master File
RNS	Residual Net Short
RT	Real-Time
RTM	Real-Time Market
RU	Regulation Up
RUC	Residual Unit Commitment
SC	Scheduling Coordinator
SDG&E	San Diego Gas & Electric Co.
SIBR	Scheduling Infrastructure & Business Rules
SOC	Standard of Conduct
SOC	State of Charge
SoCalGas	Southern California Gas Company
SP15	South Path 15
Spin	Spinning Reserve
UOG	Utility Owned Generation
VER	Variable Energy Resources
VOM	Variable Operations and Maintenance